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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
DOES ACTIVE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ADD VALUE?  This question has been the source of 
continued debate in financial economics since the contributions of Sharpe (1966), Treynor 
(1966) and Jensen (1968).  One strand of literature finds that investment managers have little 
stock-selection ability consistent with the efficient market framework of Fama (1970).  Research 
from the United States by Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996) and the United Kingdom by Leger 
(1997) finds that the investment management industry, on average, destroys value for investors 
through under-performing benchmark returns.  For instance, Gruber (1996) reports that the 
average mutual fund under-performs index returns by some 65 basis points per annum for the 
period 1985 through 1994.  These studies advocate a passive approach to the stock-selection 
problem. 
 
By contrast, another strand of literature finds some limited evidence of stock-selection ability by 
managers.  Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Wermers (2000) and Kosowski, Timmermann, 
Wermers and White (2001) find that investment managers select stocks that outperform 
benchmark returns, reflecting the incomplete arbitrage model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  
Moskowitz (2000) explains that this second set of studies examines the individual equity 
holdings of funds, creating a hypothetical portfolio for each fund that contains only stocks and 
does not account for transaction costs or expenses.  Wermers (2000) reports that while the gross 
returns from equity holdings outperform a broad market index by 130 basis points per year, the 
net fund returns under-perform the same index by 100 basis points per year1. 
                                                          
1 Wermers (2000) reports that of this 230 basis points difference, approximately 160 basis points is split evenly 
between fund expenses and transaction costs, with the remainder attributed to bond and cash holdings. 
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While both schools take differing approaches to the evaluation problem, considerable consensus 
is found that, as an industry, investment managers under-perform stated benchmarks on an after-
fee basis (i.e., post transaction costs and management expenses).  The value (or otherwise) of 
active management has immediate implications for Australia’s system of retirement funding, 
termed superannuation2.  This is potentially important as the international experience suggests 
that active investing resulted in a high-cost production function for investment management that 
yields, in aggregate, poor results.  Investors that select an active fund require the manager to 
execute stock trades at prices sufficiently different from fully-informed prices to, first, 
compensate them for the cost of becoming informed and, second, to earn superior risk-adjusted 
returns. 
 
Recent research considering this issue by Drew and Noland (2000), Drew and Stanford (2000, 
2001a, 2003), Sawicki (2000) and Sawicki and Ong (2000) for the Australian setting provides 
corroborating evidence of the experience in the United States.  Using techniques comparable to 
Gruber (1996), Drew and Stanford (2000) find that the average domestic equity superannuation 
fund under-performs benchmark returns by a range of 46 to 93 basis points per annum for the 
period 1991 through 19993.  Drew and Stanford (2000) find that as an industry, investment 
managers destroy value for superannuation members, with the costs of research and trading 
associated with active management being largely sunk. 
 
                                                          
2 A common type of managed fund in Australia is the superannuation fund. Superannuation funds are designed to 
set aside an amount during the working lives of people so as to meet their financial needs during retirement.  
3 Moreover, Drew and Stanford (2001b) find that active funds are regularly terminated due to poor performance, 
with survivorship bias negatively affecting industry performance by 23 basis points per annum on a risk-adjusted 
basis. 
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This study departs with the tradition of a broad industry based evaluation of the investment 
management industry and considers whether the portfolio returns achieved by individual 
investment managers persist through time.  Are there investment managers that have a ‘hot hand’ 
providing consistently high returns for investors?  Can investors fashion a fund selection strategy 
that would, ex-ante, permit them to garner superior returns?  Specifically, this study tests the 
hypothesis that the relative return achieved by a fund last year has no predictive value for 
tomorrow. 
 
 
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
The ability to predict the future performance of funds based on ex-ante information has been the 
topic of intense debate by investors, practitioners and researchers alike.  The received statement 
of market efficiency, the efficient market hypothesis, implies that historical performance is no 
guide to future performance and that any excess performance achieved by an investment 
manager is the result of chance, not the skillful application of active stock selection techniques.  
However, empirical testing of this position has provided mixed results over the 1990s. 
 
The persistence case, forwarded by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Kahn and Rudd (1995), Bal and Leger (1996), 
Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996b), Gruber (1996)4, Stewart (1998), and Carpenter and Lynch 
(1999) report that past returns and relative rankings are useful in predicting returns and rankings 
                                                          
4 Gruber (1996) finds that expenses, raw returns, risk-adjusted alphas, multifactor asset pricing model alphas and 
new money flows into mutual funds forecast positive relative performance. 
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in the short run (1 to 3 years).  Grinblatt and Titman (1992) provide longer-term evidence of 
persistence (10 years), indicating that there is positive persistence in mutual fund performance. 
 
In a novel approach, Bauman and Miller (1994, 1995) rank the performance of funds over 
complete stock market cycles, reporting that the correlations of portfolio performance rankings 
from one market cycle to the next are generally positive and meaningful.  Gruber (1996) 
concludes that these results are of “economic importance (pp.795)” with investors buying the top 
ranked funds from previous periods earning superior raw and risk-adjusted returns in the future.  
If the persistence anomaly holds, superannuation investors could achieve their retirement 
objectives far more rapidly through the selection of active managers, on an ex-ante basis, that 
would consistently deliver superior returns. 
 
The case rejecting the differential skill of managers consistently through time is led by Troutman 
(1991), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), 
Bogle (1995), Malkiel (1995), Carhart (1997), Cheng, Pi and Wort (1999).  These researchers 
consider both raw and risk-adjusted returns from individual funds and investment management 
firms, answering the question of whether persistence is economically significant in the negative. 
 
The contribution of Carhart (1997) shows the failure of the capital asset pricing model to capture 
the cross-section of fund returns (particularly relating to short-term momentum effects in stock 
returns) is responsible for the persistence puzzle.  Carhart (1997) observes that performance 
persistence is simply a matter of luck, stating that  “(these funds) accidentally end up holding last 
year’s winners.  Since the returns on these stocks are above average in the ensuing year, if these 
funds simply hold their winning stocks, they will enjoy higher one-year expected returns and 
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incur no additional transaction costs for this portfolio.  With so many mutual funds, it does not 
seem unlikely that some funds will be holding many of last year’s winning stocks simply by 
chance (pp. 73).”  This study adjusts for risk using the Sharpe (1966, 1994) index, in an attempt 
to mitigate the problem of benchmark inefficiency. 
 
Arteaga, Ciccotello and Grant (1998) find that performance persistence by investment 
management firms is captured by marketing oriented explanations.  For instance, Arteaga et al 
(1998) report that incubator funds remain small while private, but once opened, quickly increase 
in size and revert to median performance5.  This strategic behaviour by the investment 
management industry provides the appearance of superior performance, with poor-performing 
incubator funds (and their track record) closed or merged into a larger fund.  Researchers have 
also recently found evidence rejecting performance persistence outside traditional equity funds.  
Using a sample of hedge funds in the United States, Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) 
report no evidence of performance predictability on a raw return and risk-adjusted basis.   
 
Troutman (1991) describes the reliance investors place on past performance data when selecting 
funds as a “cognitive error, as many (trustees) see strong past performance and prestigious client 
lists as representative of future investment management ability (pp. 37).”  The implication of 
findings largely supportive of the efficient market hypothesis by this second group of researchers 
is neatly summarised by Lakonishok et al (1992).  Lakonishok et al (1992) deduce that no 
evidence of return persistence over time permits researchers to “make the stronger statement that 
not only do (pension) funds on average fail to add value, but the same is true for just about all of 
them (pp. 356).” 
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The performance persistence debate has immediate implications for Australia’s superannuation 
fund industry, particularly for the choice of fund decision.  Shefrin (2000) suggests that “there 
does seem to be something of a hot-hands effect.  But most investors misread what this 
performance says about the future … (investors) tend to attribute too much of that success to 
skill rather than luck (pp. 174).”  The continued controversy surrounding the predictability (or 
otherwise) of fund returns provides the motivation for this study to explore whether the hot-hand 
anomaly can be exploited in an economically significant manner for superannuation investors.  
In investigating this question, we consider the fund selection problem from the perspective of a 
retail investor6.  Specifically, this study considers: 
 
1.  The randomness of Australian equity superannuation fund performance, using past 
performance (raw and risk-adjusted returns) as the criterion for fund selection; 
2.  A real-world simulation of the actual results achieved by this system of fund selection over 
the 1990s; and 
3.  Implications for the fund selection decision to be made by retail superannuation investors7. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Arteaga et al (1998) also find that the first-year success of selection attention funds also attract a large amount of 
cash inflows, which undermines their subsequent performance. 
6 Retail funds are superannuation products that typically have a minimum initial investment amount of AUD 2,000 
and subsequent minimum contributions of AUD 100.  Retail funds are commonly used by individual-investors with 
superannuation assets of less than AUD 100,000 to be invested per fund. 
7 Alternate questions considered in the contemporary literature have included: comparing professional management 
versus the returns of individual-investors (Barber and Odean 2000); compensation of advisers (Coles, Suay and 
Woodbury 2000); investor response to past performance using flow data (Sawicki 2000); and, the price effects of 
fund trading (Edelen and Warner 2001). 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The data used in this study consists of monthly returns for a sample of 148 retail “Australian 
Equity Superannuation Funds - General” as classified by Morningstar, as well as monthly returns 
on an accumulation market portfolio index from January 1991 through December 1999.  The 
fund returns are obtained from Morningstar’s Australian Superannuation Funds database; with 
the market return provided by the Australian Stock Exchange.  The monthly fund data provided 
by Morningstar was net of management fees and excluded entry and exit loads.  The sample 
included all funds that existed over the sample period (including all terminated funds).  The non-
exculsion of funds that did not survive the entire sample period is designed to minimise the 
impact of the methodological flaw known as survivorship bias8. 
 
This study is concerned with whether a cognitive bias toward past performance data by 
superannuation investors is detrimental to total portfolio returns.  Specifically, we ask whether, 
on an ex-ante basis, investors are able to differentiate between luck and investment manager skill 
in an economically meaningful way.  Given our focus on the problem from a retail perspective, 
the selection of performance metrics must reflect techniques that are accessible and commonly 
employed by individual-investors (and their financial advisers) to guide fund choice.  Following 
our research motivation, two annual performance metrics are considered: first, raw or risk-
unadjusted returns; and, second, a Sharpe index proxy of risk-adjusted returns, estimated as the 
fund’s annual excess return over the Reserve Bank of Australia 13-week treasury note divided by 
                                                          
8 Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996a) argue that samples that do not correct for attrition will overstate the return that 
funds earn for their investors.  Further, ignoring attrition may differentially impact the return reported for funds with 
different objectives, because funds with different objectives may have different rates of attrition.  Brown et al 
(1992) show that the strength of survivorship bias can be strong enough to account for the evidence favouring return 
predictability. 
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the fund’s annual standard deviation of returns9.  Across the two metrics, several experiments 
were conducted to test for persistence in Australian equity superannuation fund returns.  
Specifically, the testing procedure was divided into three steps: 
 
1.  Following Bogle (1995), we calculated the past returns of all funds, selected the top five, 
ten and twenty in each calendar year period, and then recorded the future yearly return 
actually achieved10. 
2.  Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Kahn and Rudd (1995) 
and Brown et al (1999) test persistence by using a year-by-year cross-sectional regression 
of past returns on current returns.  Such a technique is also used in this study with a 
significant t-statistic for the slope coefficient leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis 
that past performance is unrelated to future performance11.  A significant positive 
(negative) slope coefficient is evidence of performance persistence (reversal); and, 
3.  Finally, a non-parametric two-way contingency matrix experiment employed by 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Kahn and Rudd (1995), Malkiel (1995), Bal and Leger 
(1996) and Brown et al (1999) is adopted as a confirmatory measure.  First, we sort the 
funds into winners and losers in period t-1 and winners and losers in period t.  We 
distinguished winners from losers by ranking fund performance to the median 
performance, defining the above-median performers as winners and below-median 
performing funds as losers.  If the statistical evidence shows that winners in period t-1 
                                                          
9 The Sharpe (1966, 1994) ratio measures the expected return per unit of risk for a zero-investment strategy.  
Support for selection of the Sharpe index as a proxy for risk-adjusted returns is provided by Bal and Leger (1996) 
based on Roll’s (1977) critique.  Unlike the Sharpe index, Bal and Leger (1996) explain that there is an implicit 
benchmark portfolio in using the Treynor (1966) and Jensen (1968) techniques.  Treynor and Jensen measures can 
only be estimated with respect to a market index, making it difficult to interpret the measure within a CAPM 
equilibrium framework due to inefficient benchmarks.  For a discussion of the limitations of single-index measures 
and multi-index alternatives for Australian equity superannuation funds see Drew and Stanford (2000). 
10 Due to a sample size of over 800 funds, Bogle (1995) considers the top twenty funds only. 
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persist as winners in period t, we argue that this is evidence of performance persistence12.  
The contingency tables illustrate the frequency of four possible outcomes: winner-winner 
(WW); loser-winner (LW); winner-loser (WL); and, loser-loser (LL). 
 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Raw returns 
 
We commenced our analysis of performance persistence in raw returns through an examination 
of how the best performing funds in one year perform the following year using Bogle’s (1995) 
framework.  To minimise the possibility of randomness in any single year, we made comparisons 
of fund rankings in each year throughout the 1990s (i.e., how the top five, ten and twenty fund 
performers of 1991 ranked in 1992, through to how the best performing funds in 1998 performed 
in 1999). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 The cross-sectional regression takes the form αit = α + bαit-1 + ei, where: αit is the performance measure for fund i 
in period t; b is the slope coefficient measuring performance persistence; αit-1 is the performance measure for fund i 
in period t-1; and, ei is the random error term. 
12 Following Malkiel (1995) the z-test for repeat winners was calculated as follows.  Let p be the probability that a 
winning fund continues to be a winner in the next year, and assume independence across funds.  If there is no 
performance persistence, we would expect p to equal 0.5.  Therefore, evidence against persistence in winning would 
be provided by failing to reject the hypothesis that p = 0.5.  Since the random variable Y of the number of 
persistently winning funds will take the form of a binomial distribution b(n, p), we conduct a binomial test to see if 
the probability p of persistent winning is greater than 0.5.  Malkiel (1995) and Bers (1998) note that when n is 
reasonably large, say when n ≥ 20, the random Z = (Y – np) / np (1 - p), which is shown in Table 3, will be 
approximately distributed as normal with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
 
 11 
 
Table 1 Rank order of top five, ten and twenty funds, raw returns 
Raw returns Rank in 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
 Year one         Year two 
 1 68 49 66 132 12 112 127 57 78 
 2 77 86 33 131 1 109 128 112 85 
 3 78 9 50 124 7 2 26 113 51 
 4 62 10 19 94 139 120 27 114 73 
 5 11 86 18 95 138 1 125 51 66 
 6 69 87 25 130 135 83 126 55 89 
 7 70 37 12 128 130 10 20 123 66 
 8 71 38 13 129 71 5 21 124 56 
 9 72 85 4 127 34 6 22 120 55 
 10 66 84 5 125 35 16 24 121 60 
 11 67 4 53 126 118 15 30 122 67 
 12 47 35 34 123 119 54 31 126 71 
 13 48 36 35 121 113 139 25 128 81 
 14 63 75 37 122 114 138 28 127 88 
 15 64 76 67 120 115 137 123 130 104 
 16 74 77 59 118 124 132 124 131 105 
 17 75 78 60 117 125 44 9 10 65 
 18 55 79 64 100 121 38 10 13 60 
 19 56 69 65 99 122 39 11 9 59 
 20 40 70 37 31 123 40 7 117 58 
Summary of average raw returns (% p.a.) 
Top 5 funds 33.58 -2.22 27.17 -2.92 12.85 17.49 15.31 1.41 25.52 11.83 
           
Top 10 funds 28.67 -3.11 27.72 0.87 10.63 14.20 17.73 5.21 23.03 12.04 
           
Top 20 funds 24.69 -2.32 29.17 -2.88 11.07 11.83 16.53 7.33 23.91 11.83 
           
All funds 14.94 1.11 33.21 -3.97 16.61 13.84 11.76 7.34 31.28 13.90 
           
Market 15.78 -1.40 37.62 -7.78 20.15 12.32 15.17 12.57 33.09 15.22 
           
No. of funds 113 80 87 98 132 143 139 135 135 119 
 
The evidence provided in Table 1 suggests that a top performing fund in one year has borne no 
systematic relationship to its ranking in the subsequent year.  An equally weighted portfolio of 
the top five ranked funds in the first year provides a raw return of +33.58 per cent, over double 
the average return for all funds of +14.94 per cent.  In the second year, the average return falls to 
+11.83 per cent, below the average fund return of +13.90 per cent.  Funds that rank in the top 
five in a given year, on average, ranked 71 (of 119 funds) in the subsequent year.  We follow Lo 
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(1991) and Bogle (1995) in describing this as evidence of mean reversion.  When examining the 
question of performance persistence over a full decade, it appears from the preliminary analysis 
that a strategy of investing in the best performing funds of the past year provides no ex-ante 
information regarding the selection of winners in the subsequent year. 
 
Our second test of persistence is a year-by-year cross-sectional regression of past returns on 
current returns.  Positive estimates of the coefficient b with significant t-statistics are evidence of 
persistence.  In this case, period t-1 performance contains useful information for predicting 
period t performance.  Figure 1 shows eight scatter plots (1991-92 through 1998-99) with OLS 
lines showing the regression slopes for each of these tests13.  These results are summarised in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Repeat-winner test results, raw returns 
Year b-coefficient t-statistic R2 
1991-92 -0.2200 -4.6076 0.2302 
1992-93 -0.2465 -3.0253 0.1050 
1993-94 -0.0814 -0.9764 0.0111 
1994-95 -0.4210 -8.5368 0.4447 
1995-96 -0.0455 -0.5192 0.0021 
1996-97 0.6326 5.4857 0.1801 
1997-98 0.4260 7.1694 0.2787 
1998-99 -1.0662 -8.9193 0.3743 
1991-92 to 
1998-99 
-0.1277 -1.7412 0.2033 
 
 
The results reported in Table 2 show that winners follow winners in an economically meaningful 
way in 1996-97 and 1997-98.  However, this pattern reverses in 1991-92, 1992-93, 1994-95 and 
1998-99.  In these periods winners lose, with a significant reversal pattern evident.  Over the  
 
 13 
Figure 1 
Year-by-year performance persistence for funds, raw returns 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Brown et al (1999) note that the upper right quadrant in each panel gives the WW category and the lower left 
quadrant corresponds to the LL category (referred to in Table 4 of this study). 
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entire period, a non-significant relationship was found, with the estimated slope coefficient being 
negative, indicating a bias toward an annual reversal of returns.  Given the inconsistency of the 
persistence results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no systematic persistence on a raw 
return basis. 
 
Table 3 Two-way contingency matrix, raw returns 
Raw returns  Next year % repeat z-test repeat 
Initial year  Winner Loser winners Winners 
1991 Winner 12 24 33.3 -2.0 
 Loser 26 11   
1992 Winner 16 26 38.1 -1.5 
 Loser 26 12   
1993 Winner 24 21 53.3 0.4 
 Loser 20 22   
1994 Winner 14 33 29.8 -2.8 
 Loser 35 11   
1995 Winner 38 28 57.6 1.2 
 Loser 32 33   
1996 Winner 39 32 54.9 0.8 
 Loser 32 36   
1997 Winner 44 25 63.8 2.3 
 Loser 25 41   
1998 Winner 25 44 36.2 -2.3 
 Loser 44 22   
1991 to 1999 Winner 213 233 47.8 -0.9 
 Loser 240 188   
 
Finally, we used contingency tables in a non-parametric test of performance predictability.  
Table 3 confirms that there is little evidence of persistence in fund performance over the 1990s.  
The null hypothesis of no winning predictability is not rejected in any of the years covered on a 
raw returns basis, with no statistically significant results recorded.  For the individual years, 5 
years out of 9 indicated negative persistence, that is, losing following a winning year.  In 
addition, a separate analysis was conducted indicating little evidence of persistent under-
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performance (popularly termed the “cold-hand” phenomenon, or LL) over the sample period14.  
The non-parametric evidence suggests that, over the 1990s, winners tended to repeat 48 per cent 
of the time, a result largely harmonious with the toss of a fair coin. 
 
B. Risk-adjusted returns 
Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi and Ogden (1994) forward that the most egregious error committed 
during any assessment of fund performance is conducting a comparison of fund returns without 
consideration of differential risk.  Further, Tucker et al (1994) observe that while researchers 
have been aware of the need to account for differential risk for more than 30 years, individual 
investors often persist in ignoring this critical issue.  Motivated by the critique of Tucker et al 
(1994), we test for predictability in the risk-adjusted returns of Australian equity superannuation 
funds using Sharpe indices as a proxy.  The reward-to-variability or Sharpe ratio is a popular tool 
used by: financial advisers recommending funds to retail investors; asset consultancy firms 
providing advice to trustees; and, is the basis of star-rating systems for funds developed by firms 
such as Morningstar15. 
 
As with raw returns, Table 4 illustrates that those funds that top league tables on a risk-adjusted 
basis in any given year generally fail to outperform industry and market returns in the following 
period.  The only period when a strategy of investing in the best performing funds (top five, ten 
 
                                                          
14 We repeat the experiment to test for a cold hand in fund manager returns or persistence in the LL category.  A 
fund that was denoted a loser in the first year, tended to repeat the performance on 44 per cent of occasions over the 
sample period.  Unlike the hot hand results, one significant result was recorded for 1994-95 with a z-test result of -
3.5.  This indicates significant reversal, that is, winning following losing and vice-versa.  This is not evidence of a 
cold hand, but rather mean reversion. 
15 Morningstar rates the investment performance of funds using a rating system of one to five stars.  For a complete 
discussion of the anatomy of the rating system see Blume (1998) and Sharpe (1998).  For an analysis of the impact 
of mutual fund age on Morningstar ratings see Morey (2001). 
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Table 4 Rank order of top five, ten and twenty funds, risk-adjusted returns 
Risk-adjusted Rank in 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
 Year one         Year two 
 1 72 34 51 133 14 78 135 97 77 
 2 80 84 66 134 4 139 123 119 94 
 3 79 30 15 135 9 115 120 120 78 
 4 66 31 14 112 128 129 125 121 91 
 5 67 75 10 117 129 119 126 2 81 
 6 68 76 11 118 130 138 23 89 82 
 7 69 77 62 119 131 3 130 110 88 
 8 62 3 39 115 65 2 124 111 65 
 9 8 68 7 116 109 6 26 102 55 
 10 59 42 12 122 110 4 27 103 60 
 11 60 43 13 123 117 5 20 104 61 
 12 38 44 27 113 118 8 21 105 59 
 13 39 39 28 114 119 7 22 108 60 
 14 63 40 29 104 123 44 24 109 67 
 15 64 41 8 80 124 82 25 113 67 
 16 45 20 9 101 120 55 30 114 62 
 17 46 21 5 102 121 93 31 48 58 
 18 70 17 9 103 122 94 9 49 59 
 19 71 18 50 91 80 102 10 50 59 
 20 41 69 67 27 81 103 11 93 62 
Summary of average Sharpe ratios (p.a.) 
Top 5 funds 10.618 -5.826 0.581 3.734 -5.647 2.407 -2.155 -4.168 23.767 1.587 
           
Top 10 funds 8.447 -5.064 1.573 3.858 -5.694 0.243 -0.303 -3.142 19.354 1.353 
           
Top 20 funds 6.419 -4.766 2.202 3.923 -4.577 -0.821 -0.549 -1.659 18.244 1.500 
           
All funds 1.695 -4.097 2.491 2.635 -2.803 0.042 -1.260 -2.147 21.948 2.101 
           
Market 1.977 -3.751 3.317 1.727 -0.738 -0.717 -0.485 -0.349 17.456 2.113 
           
No. of funds 113 80 87 98 132 143 139 135 135 119 
 
and twenty) garnered superior risk-adjusted returns was the 1993 selection-period and 1994 
investment-period, with limited evidence of positive persistence also recorded in the second half 
of the decade.  Across the entire sample period, an investor skilled (or lucky) enough to select 
the top five ranked funds each year achieved an average Sharpe index of 10.618 versus the all 
fund average of 1.695.  Next year, the average Sharpe for the best five performing funds falls to 
1.587, which is below the average fund result of 2.101 and the Sharpe ratio for the market 
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portfolio at 
 
 18 
2.113.  The fall from best performing in year t-1 to year t for risk-adjusted returns is dramatic.  
Evidence of mean reversion is prevalent with those funds that rank in the top five in a given year 
on a risk-adjusted basis, on average, ranked 84 (of 119 funds) in the subsequent year. 
 
Table 5 Repeat-winner test results, risk-adjusted returns 
Year Coefficient t-statistic R2 
1991-92 0.0020 0.0524 0.0011 
1992-93 -0.1066 -1.6023 0.0319 
1993-94 -0.1127 1.2486 0.0191 
1994-95 -0.4118 -6.4714 0.3152 
1995-96 0.0045 0.0678 0.0025 
1996-97 0.1294 2.1279 0.0320 
1997-98 1.2486 12.0501 0.5219 
1998-99 -0.7992 -3.0533 0.0660 
1991-92 to 
1998-99 
-0.0057 0.5525 0.1233 
 
The coefficient, t-statistic and R2 data provided in Table 5 are the result of regressing fund 
returns in one year against returns in the next year where returns are reported for funds in both 
years16.  The risk-adjusted evidence provides no support to the hypothesis of investment 
managers having differential skill.  In total, statistically significant results were recorded in four 
of the eight observation periods, however, an equal proportion of statistically significant positive 
and negative results were recorded, suggesting both positive persistence and reversal effects.   
 
Over the sample period, the relationship was not significant, with the estimated coefficient  
                                                          
16 For reasons of space we do not report risk-adjusted scatter diagrams for the eight periods.  Summary results from 
the OLS regressions are provided in Table 5. 
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Table 6 Two-way contingency matrix, risk-adjusted returns 
Risk-adjusted  Next year % repeat z-test repeat 
Initial year  Winner Loser Winners Winners 
1991 Winner 19 29 39.6 -1.4 
 Loser 16 9   
1992 Winner 21 23 47.7 -0.3 
 Loser 26 10   
1993 Winner 19 25 43.2 -0.9 
 Loser 11 27   
1994 Winner 21 23 47.7 -0.3 
 Loser 38 11   
1995 Winner 28 62 31.1 -3.6 
 Loser 24 18   
1996 Winner 28 27 50.9 0.1 
 Loser 35 49   
1997 Winner 49 19 72.1 3.6 
 Loser 48 19   
1998 Winner 41 57 41.8 -1.6 
 Loser 9 27   
1991 to 1999 Winner 226 265 46.0 -1.8 
 Loser 207 170   
 
suggesting, on average, a slight reversal trend17.  Interestingly, across both raw and risk-adjusted 
returns, the use of past returns as an explanatory variable in a year-by-year cross-sectional 
                                                          
17 This test does not account for the possibility of cross-correlation among funds.  For any given period it is likely 
that funds managed according to the same “style” will perform similarly, at least to some extent (Malkiel 1995).  To 
test for such potential cross-correlation impacts on our conclusions, we attempted to repeat the experiments for fund 
categories.  However, Morningstar’s classification system does not classify funds within “Australian Equity 
Superannuation Funds – General” into categories such as growth, income, value, etc.  Currently, the only 
distinguishing features of the funds relate to their names (e.g., ethical, imputation, small companies fund).  
However, the majority of fund names are simply “Fund Manager X Australian Share Superannuation Fund.”  We 
are currently developing a characteristics based classification system to differentiate manager styles.  State-of-the-
art research by Davis (2001) directly addresses the issue of whether any particular investment styles reliably deliver 
abnormal performance and considers whether any evidence of performance persistence can be found when funds of 
similar styles are compared.  For the period 1965 through 1998, Davis (2001) finds that none of the styles employed 
by US equity mutual fund managers exhibit positive abnormal returns.  Davis (2001) reports some evidence of 
short-run performance persistence among the best-performing growth funds (hot hand) and among the worst 
performing small-cap funds (cold hand), however, both these results were not sustained beyond one year.  Davis 
(2001) concludes that the impact of cross-correlation among funds is limited, stating that the “economic benefit(s) 
to active management … are not obvious (pp. 25).” 
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regression fails to capture the cross-section of future returns in an economically meaningful 
manner18. 
 
Again we employed a non-parametric test of performance predictability, on this occasion using 
risk-adjusted results, as a confirmatory measure.  Table 6 shows there are minimal differences 
across the sample period in terms of the percentage of persistent winners and what would be 
expected by chance.  As with the regression results reported in Table 5, significant positive 
persistence was recorded around 1997-98.  However, a reversal pattern of significance was also 
evident from the 1995 (winner) to 1996 (loser).  For the individual periods, 7 years out of 9 
indicated negative persistence, that is, losing following a winning year.  In addition, the data 
indicated no evidence of the cold-hand anomaly, with no significant results of loser-loser 
repetition in any of the observation periods.  Over the 1990s, winners tended to repeat 46 per 
cent of the time, a result corroborating the raw return findings. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SELECTION 
 
For retail investors faced with the problem of selecting a fund to manage the domestic equity 
portion of their asset allocation, there is little likelihood of earning abnormal returns by selecting 
the best performing fund managers from the previous period.  The evidence presented in this 
study supports Bogle’s (1992) claim that “investment management is a field fraught with 
fragility and fallibility, where today’s careful, rational fund selections are too often tomorrow’s 
embarrassments (pp. 94).”  Bogle (1992) notes that while it is virtually impossible to pick the 
                                                          
18 In both the raw and risk-adjusted year-by-year cross-sectional regression experiments, the Durbin-Watson 
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winning funds from year to year, it is easy to pick a single winner – a passive all-market index 
fund.  The evidence presented in Tables 1 and 4 highlights the superiority of the market portfolio 
against a cohort of active funds on a raw and risk-adjusted return basis. 
 
Malkiel (1995) supports this claim, suggesting “most investors would be considerably better off 
by purchasing a low expense index fund, than by trying to select an active fund manager who 
appears to possess a hot hand (pp. 571).”  Recent research by Malkiel and Radisich (2001) finds 
that index funds have regularly produced rates of return exceeding those of active equity funds 
by 100 to 200 basis points per annum in the United States over the 1990s, finding that there are 
two reasons for the excess performance by passive funds: “management fees and trading costs 
(pp. 10).” 
 
The issue of fund expenses requires further analysis.  The funds investigated in this study had an 
average annual management expense ratio of 3.7 per cent per annum19.  As discussed in the 
research design section of the paper, this study considered fund returns net of management fees 
but excluding entry and exit loads to test for return persistence.  Therefore, when conducting the 
various experiments to test the hot hand anomaly, the costs levied by the investment manager on 
entering and exiting their fund was assumed away.  The average entry fee for the funds 
investigated was 1.8 per cent, with an exit load of 2.0 per cent.  These institutional costs are 
considerable, and add further weight to the study’s non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
differential skill among managers. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
statistics were 1.98 and 2.01 respectively.  Given no evidence of serial correlation, we do not pursue further into the 
first-order autoregressive AR1 and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
19 Typically, the management fee is accrued daily and is payable quarterly in arrears (or upon the full withdrawal of 
the fund) by the redemption of units. 
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The active management techniques employed by the investment managers considered in this 
study appear to add little value in the transformation of retirement savings into retirement 
income.  Active investing is high cost, incurs substantial entry and exit loads and generates 
higher taxation burdens for investors than a passive alternative.  The marginal benefits (MB) of 
active management are far exceeded by its marginal costs (MC).  Those funds that can achieve a 
resultant MB > MC from active stock selection in any given year seem destined to reverse this 
trend the following year.  The findings echo Kendall’s (1953) well-known epithet that “the series 
looks like a wandering one, almost as if once a week the demon of chance drew a random 
number from a symmetrical population of fixed dispersion and added it to the current price to 
determine the next period’s price (pp.23).” 
 
Market efficiency survives the challenge from the performance persistence literature.  Using a 
number of reasonable strategies, the results of this study provide little comfort for those retail 
investors (and their financial advisers) relying heavily on a fund’s track record to guide 
selection.  A rational, self-seeking agent would achieve their retirement income objectives far 
more rapidly through implementing a passive approach to both fund and asset selection.  As we 
proceed toward member-choice in superannuation, the mean-reverting behaviour of investment 
manager returns raises a number of questions regarding the optimal design of a superannuation 
fund – a topic we consider in our next paper. 
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